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Abstract
Experimental facilities are scaled models of commercial nuclear power plants, and are of great
importance to improve nuclear power plants safety. Thus, the results obtained in the experi-
ments undertaken in such facilities are essential to develop and improve the models implemented
in the thermal-hydraulic codes, which are used in safety analysis. The experiments and inter-
comparisons of the simulated results are usually performed in the frame of international pro-
grams in which different groups of several countries simulate the behaviour of the plant under
the accidental conditions established, using different codes and models. The results obtained are
compared and studied to improve the knowledge on codes performance and nuclear safety.
Thus, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), in the nuclear safety work area, auspices several
programs which involve experiments in different experimental facilities. Among the experiments
proposed in NEA programmes, one on them consisted in performing a counterpart test between
ROSA/LSTF and PKL facilities, with the main objetive of determining the effectiveness of late
accident managment actions in a small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA). This study
was proposed as a result of the conclusion obtained by the NEA Working Group on the Analysis
and Management of Accidents, which analyzed different installations and observed differences
in the measurementes of core exite temperature (CET) and maximum peak cladding temperature
(PCT). In particular, the transient consists of a small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA) in
a hot leg with additional failure of safety systems but with accident management measures (AM),
consisting of a fast secondary-side depressurization, activated by the CET. The paper presents
the results obtained in the simulations for both installations using TRACE, observing, in general,
a good agreement with the experiments. However, ROSA/LSTF calculations underestimated
the maximum PCT value, what might be explained by the higher core level predicted in the
simulation compared with the experiment. In PKL calculations, PCT maximum value is slightly
higher than in the experiment, and the core level predicted is lower. In the comparison of the
evolution of both installations a different timing in the transient events is observed, due to the
difference in the pressure vessel design. Thus, when PKL vessel is modified with some of the
ROSA/LSTF features, the evolution of the new PKL model behaviour is closer the one observed
in ROSA/LSTF calculations.
Keywords: ROSA, PKL, Core exit temperature, peak cladding temperature, TRACE.
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: scarlos@iqn.upv.es (S. Carlos ), anquevi@iqn.upv.es (A. Querol),
Preprint submitted to Nuclear Engineering and Design October 7, 2015
sergalbe@iqn.upv.es (S. Gallardo), frasansa@etsii.upv.es (F. Sanchez-Saez), jovillo0@iqn.upv.es (J.F.






CET Core Exit Temperature
ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System
HPIS High Pressure Injection System
LPIS Low pressure Injection System
MS IV Main Steam Isolation Valves
NEA Nuclear Energy Agency
NV Normalized value referred to steady state
PCT Peak Cladding Temperature
PKL Primarkreislauf Versuchsanlage
PV Pressure Vessel
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
ROS A/LS T F Rig-of-Safety Assessment Large Scale Test Facility
RV Relief Valves
S BLOCA Small break Loss-of-Coolant Accident
S G Steam Generator
1. Introduction
Experimental facilities are of great importance in nuclear safety to improve the knowledge
on commercial nuclear power plants behaviour under normal and accidental situations. Thus, it
is possible to evaluate the evolution of the main safety variables under an accidental situation
and identify generic issues that may affect the safety of nuclear power plants. Such facilities are
scaled models of commercial plants, so the lessons learnt from the analysis of the safety variables
evolution during the accidental sequence should serve to extend the knowledge on the behaviour
of their nuclear power plant of reference, in order to improve nuclear power plants safety.
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Moreover, the results obtained in the experiments undertaken in such facilities are essential to
develop and improve the models implemented in the thermal-hydraulic codes. Thus, the data col-
lected in the experiments are necessary in the assessment of the capabilities of thermal-hydraulic
codes to reproduce the different physical phenomena that may take place inside the reactor in ac-
cidental situations. Such simulations are performed using best estimate thermal-hydraulic codes,
as RELAP-5, TRAC, CATHARE, ATHLET or TRACE (Belaid et al. , 2013) (Carlos et al. , 2008)
(Freixa J. and Manera A. , 2010). Among these codes, RELAP-5 and TRAC have traditionally
been used to reproduce transients of Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) and Boiling Water Reac-
tors, respectively. Nowadays, TRACE code (TRAC/RELAP Advanced Computational Engine)
is being developed to make use of the more favourable characteristics of RELAP-5 and TRAC
codes to simulate both, PWR and BWR, technologies.
The experiments and inter-comparisons of the simulated results are usually performed in
the frame of international programs in which different groups of several countries simulate the
behaviour of the plant under the accidental conditions established, before the experiment, what
is known as blind tests, and after the experiment, what are the post test simulations. The results
obtained are compared and studied to improve the knowledge on codes performance and nuclear
safety. Thus, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), in the nuclear safety work area, auspices
several programs which involve experiments in different experimental facilities (Carlos et al.
, 2011), (Reventos et al. , 2008), (Gallardo et al. , 2012). Among them, one can find the
OECD/NEA Rig-of-safety Assessment (ROSA-2) project and PKL-III project. The first one
was focused on the validation of simulation models and methods for the complex phenomena of
high-safety relevance for thermal-hydraulic transients in design basis events (DBE) and beyond-
DBE of light water reactors. To achieve this objective different experiments are performed in
the Rig-of-Safety Large Scale Test Facility (ROSA/LSTF) located in Japan, which represents a
PWR Westinghouse design. The second programme was mainly focused on investigating safety
issues relevant and complex heat transfer mechanisms in current pressurised water reactor PWR
plants as well as for new PWR design concepts (Nakamura et al. , 2009) (Umminger et al. ,
2012) (Jonnet , 2013). In this programme the experiments were undertaken at Primarkreislauf
Versuchsanlage facility (PKL) in Germany which is a scaled model of a Konvoi PWR design.
Among the experiments proposed in those programmes, one of them consisted in performing
a counterpart test between both installations. Thus, the experiment is undertaken in the both
installations to analyse the effect that different technology and scale may introduce in the evolu-
tion of the main safety variables under the same accidental situation. In particular the transient
consists of a small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA) in a hot leg with additional fail-
ure of safety systems but with accident management measures. The counterpart experiment was
proposed as a result of the experiments performed by the NEA Working Group on the Analysis
and Management of Accidents in different facilities (Toth et al. , 2010). In those experiments
a significative difference between CET and PCT evolution was observed in the measurements
obtained in all the installations. Thus, as the AM measures are triggered by the CET values but
the safety variable normally followed in nuclear safety studies is the PCT, a more detailed study
of both variables and the relationship between them was suggested.
Thus, when a SBLOCA occurs the water inventory and pressure of the reactor coolant system
decrease and this leads to empty the reactor pressure vessel, and to core uncovering. Therefore,
it is necessary the actuation of the safety systems to inject water in the primary circuit, High
Pressure Injection System (HPIS) in this case, to maintain the core full of water and cooled.
The safety system failures postulated in this transient are no HPIS injection and no automatic
secondary-side cooldown. This situation leads to core uncovering and the clad temperature in-
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creases until core-melt scenario if no action is performed. Therefore, it is necessary to explore
the Accident Management (AM) measures necessary to prevent this scenario. The AM measures
proposed to prevent core melting is a fast secondary-side depressurization, initiated after core
uncover to re-establish the steam generators secondary side as heat sink aiming for a fast re-
duction of the primary pressure, what permits the injection through the accumulators and makes
possible the Low Pressure Injection Safety (LPIS) activation. These AM measures are activated
by the Core Exit Thermocouples measurements, so the use of Core Exit Temperature (CET) as a
valid criterion for the initiation of accident mitigation measures involving emergency operating
procedures and/or severe accident management measures has to be assessed, and the efficiency
of the accident mitigation measures proposed has to be analysed (Belaid et al. , 2013).
In order to reproduce the same transient in both installations, a conditioning phase is needed
to reach in ROSA/LSTF the same working conditions as the ones in PKL. Once this is achieved
the break is produced and the physical phenomena occurring in both installations can be com-
pared.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, both facilities are presented are described. In
section 3 the experiment is explained. The TRACE model developed for each facility is exposed
in section 4. In section 5, the results of the transient simulation are discussed. Finally, section 7
presents the main conclusions obtained.
2. Experimental facilities
Both facilities are scaled models of different nuclear power plants. Thus, ROSA/LSTF is a
scaled model of a Westinghouse and has Tsuruga-2 as reference plant and PKL is a Konvoi type
and has as reference plant Phillisburg-2 (Nakamura et al. , 2009) (Umminger et al. , 2012). Both
designs present technological differences and also different scale ratios between each technology
and their plant of reference, so a brief description of both installations is presented.
2.1. ROSA/LSTF description
ROSA/LSTF is a 1/48 volumetrically scaled, full-height, full-pressure simulator of a four
loop Westinghouse design pressurized water reactor of 3423 MWt of nominal power. The four
primary loops of the reference plant are lumped into two equal volume loops to improve two-
phase flow simulation during reactor accidents and transients mainly by achieving large diameter
horizontal legs. Each loop is sized to conserve the volumetric factor 2/48 and the relation of the
length to the square-root of the reference PWR pipe diameter (L/
√
D) to better reproduce the
same flow regime transitions in horizontal legs (JAEA , 2003)(Nakamura et al. , 2009).
The primary coolant system consists of the pressure vessel, and two primary loops being the
pressurizer located in loop A. Each loop is composed by a primary coolant pump and a steam
generator. The U-tube bundles in the steam generators have mostly the same dimensions of the
ones in the plant of reference (Nakamura et al. , 2009). The secondary-coolant system consists
of a feedwater pump and an auxiliary feedwater pump for each steam generator. The facility also
reproduces the plant emergency core cooling system, which includes the high and low pressure
injection systems, and two accumulators one in each cold leg. Fig.1 shows a scheme of the
ROSA/LSTF installation.
To simulate the core power there are 1008 electrically heated rods, being the maximum core
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Figure 1: ROSA/LSTF facility.
assembly has mostly the same dimensions as in the reference PWR to preserve the heat transfer
characteristics of the core.
2.2. PKL facility description
PKL is a full-height, reduced-pressure facility of a four loop Konvoi design pressurized water
reactor of 1300 MWe of nominal power. The facility has a scale ratio of 1/145 for volume and
power, while all the components height on the primary and secondary side correspond to real
plant dimensions. It models the entire primary system and the relevant parts of the secondary
side. In order to investigate the influence of non symmetrical boundary conditions on the system
behaviour, PKL facility is equipped with four primary loops symmetrically arranged around the
reactor pressurized vessel. Each loop contains a reactor coolant pump and a steam generator, and
the pressurizer is located in loop 2 (Umminger et al. , 2002).
The facility also models all the important safety and auxiliary systems as eight accumulators,
one in each of the hot legs and one in each of the cold legs, four independent injections from
the high and low pressure injection system, the residual heat removal system and the pressure
control in the presssurizer. Fig. 2 shows a scheme of PKL test facility.
To simulate the core power there are 314 electrically heated rods in the core assembly, being
the maximum core power a 10% of the reference PWR nominal power.
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Figure 2: PKL facility.
3. Transient description
The SBLOCA is countered by safety injection systems being triggered as soon as the set-
points of the different systems are met, being HPIS the first system being activated. In case of
total failure of the HPIS, as postulated in the experiment, the accumulators and the low pressure
injection system cannot actuate, as their pressure setpoints are lower than primary pressure when
the SBLOCA is detected. In this situation for the most PWR designs, the design-basis course
of events foresees a parallel cooldown of the primary side via the steam generators secondary
side to reach cold shutdown conditions. This cooldown process may be initiated automatically
or manually and may be performed either partially or completely.
Depending on the break size, the primary pressure evolution would lead to a significant core
heat-up before the primary pressure drops below the ACCs actuation pressure. For this reason,
it is necessary a secondary-side depressurization as accident management (AM) procedure to re-
duce the primary pressure until the appropriated values to allow ACCs and LPIS safety injections.
The signal to trigger the depressurization procedure is the core exit temperature (CET).
The range of operation of both installations is different, so it has been necessary to move
ROSA/LSTF and PKL from their normal operational state to similar working condition. The
maximum pressure value allowed in PKL is lower that in ROSA/LSTF, so is in this latter in-
stallation where there has been necessary to perform several actions to meet a pressure value
appropriated for both installations.
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3.1. ROSA/LSTF Transient description
The counterpart test corresponds to Test 3 in ROSA/LSTF (JAEA , 2012). This experiment
simulates a 1.5% hot leg SBLOCA in a PWR and it is divided in three phases: high-pressure
transient phase, conditioning phase and low-pressure transient phase. Is in the third phase when
the evolution of the main safety variables are compared with those obtained from the experiment
undertaken in PKL facility. The control logic and sequence of major events for the complete
transient are listed in Table 1. All the values presented in this table are normalized to the steady
state values.
In the high-pressure phase, the thermal-hydraulic phenomena observed at ROSA/LSTF fol-
low the typical PWR responses during a hot leg SBLOCA until the HPIS coolant injection. The
transient starts at time zero with the opening of the break valve in the hot leg of loop B and
increasing the rotational speed of the coolant pumps. Few seconds afterwards, the scram signal
is generated producing the initiation of the core power decay curve, the primary coolant pumps
coast down, a turbine trip, the closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) and also the
stop of Main Feedwater injection. HPI coolant injection starts immediately after the maximum
fuel rod surface temperature reaches 1.19 NV. This phase finishes when the primary pressure
decreases to 0.32 NV and then the break valve is temporarily closed.
In the conditioning phase, the core power is manually changed to a constant value. The
primary mass inventory is recovered by continuous HPIS coolant injection into the pressure
vessel upper plenum. When the hot leg liquid level recovers up to mid-loop condition, HPIS
injection is stopped. Then, the steam generator secondary side depressurization is produced and
the AFW injection starts. When the primary pressure reaches 0.26 NV, the relieve valves are
closed and AFW injection finishes. This phase ends when the primary pressure is around 0.29
NV.
In the low-pressure transient phase, the break valve is re-opened. Due to coolant loss through
the break, the core uncovers when core boil-off is produced. Immediately after CET reaches 1.0
NV, the steam generators secondary side depressurization is initiated by fully opening of the RVs
as AM action. The AFW injection starts in both steam generators. The ACC system is initiated
when the primary pressure is 0.17 NV and ends at 0.08 NV. The LPI system is actuated when
the pressure vessel lower plenum pressure is 0.06 NV. This phase is terminated when continuous
core cooling by the LPI system is confirmed.
3.2. PKL Transient description
In PKL installation the counterpart test corresponds to the experiment G7.1 (Areva, 2012),
and has to be compared with the third phase of ROSA/LSTF experiment, that is the low-pressure
pressure phase of the transient. Experiment G7.1 consists of a SBLOCA in the hot leg of the
primary side followed by a total failure of the high pressure injection system together with the
failure of the automatic steam generator secondary-side cooldown, with fixed power of 1.8% of
the plant of reference scaled nominal power. In such conditions, the accident mitigation proce-
dure proposed is the manual depressurization of the secondary side steam generators, followed
by the injection from the accumulators. This accidental sequence was designed to investigate the
core heat-up sequence and the effectiveness of depressurization proposed to permit the actuation
of ACCs and LPIS. Table 2 presents the sequence of the events produced in PKL facility.
The transient begins when the break in hot leg is produced and the primary circuit empties.
Secondary side depressurization is triggered by the core exit temperature (CET) setpoint at 1.0
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Table 1: Control logic and sequence of major events in ROSA/LSTF experiment.
Phase Event Condition
High pressure Break valve open Time zero
transient Scram signal Primary pressure set point
Pressurizer heater off Scram signal or pressurizer liquid level
Core power decay curve simulation Scram signal
Initiation of Primary Coolant Pump coastdown Scram signal
Turbine trip Scram signal
Closure of main steam valves Scram signal
Termination of SG Main Feedwater Scram signal
Start of HPIS PCT = 1.19NV
Break closure Primary pressure 0.32NV
Conditioning Constant core power Break closure
End of HPIS Hot leg level at mid-loop
Start of SG secondary-side depressurization End of HPIS
End of SG secondary-side depressurization Primary pressure 0.26NV
Low pressure Break valve re-open Primary pressure 0.29NV
transient SG secondary-side depressurization CET = 1.0NV
Initiation of auxiliary feedwater Initiation of AM action
Initiation of ACC system Primary pressure set point
Termination of ACC system Primary pressure set point
Initiation of LPI system Pressure vessel lower plenum pressure set point
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Table 2: Control sequence of major events in PKL experiment.
Event Condition
Break valve open Start of the transient
SG secondary-side depressurization CET 350 C MIRAR CET = 1.0NV
Initiation of ACC system MIRAR pprim = 26.6 bar Primary pressure set point
Termination of ACC system MIRAR 10.0 bar Primary pressure set point
Initiation of LPI system MIRAR 7.7 bar Pressure vessel lower plenum pressure set point
NV. As in PKL all four SG are connected, the secondary side depressurization is homogeneous
for all SG, and permits to reduce the primary pressure to reach the accumulators pressure set
point, so this system injects water in the reactor coolant line and, later on, the primary pressure
reaches LPIS activation set point and coolant injection is produced.
4. TRACE models
In both installations the transient has been simulated using the TRACE-5 V2 thermal-hydraulic
code, as it is being developed to make use of the more favourable characteristics of RELAP-5 and
TRAC codes to simulate both, PWR and BWR, technologies. TRACE code analyses transient
and steady-state neutronic-thermal-hydraulic behaviour in light water reactors. In fact, TRACE
has been designed to perform best-estimate analyses of loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs), op-
erational transients, and other accident scenarios in pressurized light-water reactors (PWRs) and
boiling light-water reactors (BWRs), and it can also model phenomena occurring in experimental
facilities designed to simulate transients in reactor systems (USNRC , 2010a) (USNRC , 2010b).
4.1. ROSA/LSTF Model
ROSA/LSTF has been modelled using 97 hydraulic components (11 BREAKs, 12 FILLs, 25
PIPEs, 2 PUMPs, 1 PRIZER, 26 TEEs, 19 VALVEs and 1 VESSEL) (USNRC , 2010a) (USNRC
, 2010b). Heat transfer between primary and secondary side, pressurizer heaters and heat losses
have been performed by using 50 Heat Structures (HTSTR) components. Cylindrical-shape
geometry has been used to best fit heat transmission. The power supplied to the vessel from 1008
fuel elements, presents in the LSTF, has been simulated using a POWER component. Figure 3
shows the nodalization of the model using the Symbolic Nuclear Analysis Package software
(SNAP) (Applied Programming Technology, 2012).
In order to model the pressure vessel, a VESSEL component has been considered. A nodal-
ization of 20 axial levels, 4 radial rings and 10 azimuthal sectors is a quite accurate model of
the real pressurized vessel. For each axial level, volume and effective flow area fractions have
been set according to technical specifications provided by the organization (JAEA , 2003). Axial
levels 1 and 2 simulate the lower plenum. The active core is located between levels 3 and 11.
Level 12 simulates the upper core plate. Levels 13 to 16 characterize the vessel upper plenum.
The upper core support plate is located in level 17. Finally, upper head is defined between levels
18 to 20. The VESSEL is connected to different 1D components: 8 Control Rod Guide Tubes
(CRGT), hot leg A and B (level 15), cold leg A and B (level 15) and a bypass channel (level 14).
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Control rod guide tubes have been simulated by PIPEs components, connecting levels 14 and 19
and allowing the flow between upper head and upper plenum.
The power ratio in the axial direction presents a peaking factor of 1.495. The radial power
profile is divided into three power zones using the first three radial rings. Depending on the
radial ring, different peaking factors have been considered (0.66 in ring 1, 1.51 in ring 2 and
1.0 in ring 3). A POWER component represents the power supplied by each HTSTR transferred
to the 3D-VESSEL through 30 HTSTRs, which simulate the 1008 fuel assemblies presents in
the ROSA/LSTF reactor core. These fuel assemblies were distributed into the 3 rings: 154 fuel
assemblies in ring 1, 356 in ring 2 and 498 in ring 3. The number of fuel rod components
associated with each heat structure has been determined from the technical documentation given,
taking into account the distribution of fuel rod elements in the vessel.
A detailed model of SG (geometry and thermal features) has been developed, due to the fact
that TRACE-5 does not include any pre-determined steam generator component. Both boiler and
downcomer components of secondary side have been modeled by TEEs components. Each SG
has 141 U-tubes, which are simulated by 3 PIPE components depending on the average length of
real U-tubes and heat transfer features. Heat transfer between primary and secondary sides has
been performed by using HTSTR components. Inner and outer surface boundary conditions for
each axial level have been set to couple HTSTR component to hydro-components (primary and
secondary fluids).
HPIS and LPIS have been simulated using FILL components. The ACC are represented by
two PIPE components. For this transient, HPI is connected to pressure vessel upper plenum.
The SBLOCA has been simulated by means of a VALVE component connected to a BREAK
component in order to establish the boundary conditions. The break, specified in Test 3 (JAEA ,
2012), is located on the hot leg of loop B downwards orientation.
4.2. PKL Model
The PKL model used consists of 136 hydraulic volumes, including two 3D VESSEL com-
ponents, 5 BREAKs, 16 FILLs, 84 PIPEs, 4 PUMPs, 21 VALVEs and 37 heat structures. Fig. 4
presents a SNAP view of the primary and secondary circuit (Applied Programming Technology,
2012). The most interesting feature in this model is the reactor pressure vessel nodalization,
that has been modelled as a combination of two VESSEL hydraulic components: core vessel and
downcomer vessel, as shown in Fig. 4. Using this nodalization the coolant paths inside the vessel
are closer to the real ones. The core vessel models the lower and upper plenums, the core, and
the head of the PKL reactor pressure vessel, while the downcomer vessel represents the part of
the reactor pressure vessel downcomer, and are connected by the two external downcomer pipes
and by the four upper head downcomer by passes.
The core vessel has been divided in 19 axial levels, 1 radial ring and 2 azimuthal sectors. In
the axial direction, the active core is modeled by 7 levels (6 to 12), and the hot legs are connected
at level 15 in radial direction. The downcomer vessel has been divided in 5 axial levels, 3 radial
levels and 2 azimuthal sectors. It is modelled as an annulus so the most internal radial level does
not belong to the model. The second radial ring connects the vessel with the reactor coolant line
cold legs and the third ring connects, in axial direction, to the downcomer pipes, which in turn
are connected to the lower plenum, represented by the lowers levels of the core vessel. For both
vessels, each axial level, volume and effective flow area fractions have been set according to PKL
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Figure 3: TRACE model for ROSA/LSTF facility.
The four primary loops are modelled with a pump and a steam generator in each loop using
PIPE and PUMP components. The U-tubes of the steam generators are lumped into three PIPE
components of different heights. The heat transfer between the primary and secondary systems
is simulated using three heat structures, one for each of the three pipes that simulate the steam
generators U-tubes.
The injections from the accumulators performed at the transient have been simulated using
a PIPE component connected to the loop by a VALVE. The locations of the injections from the
accumulators are shown in Fig 4. A LPIS injection has been simulated in each cold leg by using
FILL components connected with the loops. Finally, the SB-LOCA has been simulated with a
BREAK component connected to the hot leg 1.
The nodalization of the steam generators secondary side is also presented in Fig. 4. The four
steam generators are connected through their corresponding relieve valves to simulate depressur-
ization control considered as accident mitigation measure. In the nodalization the main steam
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Figure 4: TRACE model for PKL primary circuit.
5. Simulation results
5.1. ROSA/LSTF results
In order to compare the behaviour of both facilities, the experiment in ROSA/LSTF facility
has been divided in three phases: High pressure transient, conditioning phase and low pressure
transient. This later phase is the one compared with PKL transient. Thus, Table 3, Table 4 and
Table 5 present the chronological sequence of events during the transient and the comparison
between the experiment and TRACE results, for the high pressure transient, conditioning phase
and low pressure transient, respectively. Results presented in this section have been normalized
to the steady state value in each graph.
The comparison between experimental data and TRACE results in ROSA/LSTF is presented
through several graphs of the most important variables. Specifically, Figure 5 shows (a) the
system pressures, (b) the mass flow rate through the break, (c) the pressure vessel liquid levels
and (d) the Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT) together with the Core Exit Temperature (CET)
for each phase of the transient.
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Table 3: ROSA/LSTF high pressure transient. Chronological sequence of events.
Event Experiment TRACE-5
time (s) time (s)
Break valve open 0 0
Scram signal 29 32
Closure of SG MSIVs 32 33
Initiation of coastdown of primary coolant pumps 33 35
Termination of SG main feedwater 34 33
SI signal 37 43
Initiation of core power decay 50 47
Primary coolant pumps stopped 281 280
Primary pressure became lower than SG secondary side pressure 1310 1317
Start of increase in fuel rod surface temperature 1595 1680
Maximum fuel rod surface temperature reached 750 K 1840 1796
Initiation of HPI into PV upper plenum 1844 1796
Table 4: ROSA/LSTF conditioning phase. Chronological sequence of events.
Event Experiment TRACE5
time (s) time (s)
Break valve closure 2172 2113
Manual change of core power to constant value 2215 2500
Termination of HPI system into PV upper plenum 2852 2880
Initiation of SG secondary-side depressurization by fully opening RVs in both loops 2880 2893
Initiation of AFW in both loops 2900 2893
Termination of SG secondary-side depressurization 3028 2959
Termination of AFW in both loops 3055 2959
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Table 5: ROSA/LSTF low pressure phase. Chronological sequence of events.
Event Experiment TRACE5
time (s) time (s)
Break valve open again 3323 3303
Start of increase in fuel rod surface temperature 3983 4203
Primary pressure became lower than SG secondary side pressure 4105 4250
Core exit temperature setpoint = 623 K 4390 4507
Initiation of SG secondary-side depressurization 4394 4519
by fully opening RVs in both loops as AM action
Initiation of AFW in both loops 4410 4519
Maximum fuel rod surface temperature 4413 4545
Initiation of ACC system in both loops 4500 4590
Termination of ACC system in both loops 4829 4786
Initiation of LPI system in both loops 5003 4830
In the high pressure transient phase (until 2170 s), the primary pressure starts to decrease at
time zero when the break valve is opened causing the scram signal (see Figure 5(a)). It implies the
closure of the MSIVs and the primary coolant pumps coastdown. The steam generator secondary
side pressure increases rapidly after the closure of MSIVs. From this moment on, the steam
generator secondary side pressure starts to fluctuate by means of opening and closing the relief
valves. The primary pressure becomes lower than the secondary one at about 1250 s. When
the primary pressure reaches 0.32 NV, the break valve closes and this transient phase ends. In
general, TRACE is able to reproduce the behaviour of the system pressures during this transient
phase, although the pressure drop in the primary pressure is faster in the experiment. Thus, from
1250 s until the activation of high pressure injection system, TRACE predicted values for primary
pressure are higher than the experimental data. However, secondary side pressure calculations
are close to the experimental values during all the phase.
At the start of transient the calculated mass flow rate through the break presents a sharp
decrease, faster in the calculations than in the experiment, when the fluid turns from single-phase
liquid to two-phase flow (see Figure 5(b)). When the primary pressure becomes lower than the
secondary one, the break flow turns from two-phase flow to single-phase vapour. Both changes
of regime are well reproduced with TRACE. However, during the two-phase flow (between 250
and 1000 s), TRACE mass flow rate prediction is higher than the experiment.
Regarding the pressure vessel liquid levels, during the first 800 s the downcomer is gradually
emptied (see Figure 5(c)). After that, downcomer liquid level is maintained until 1250 s when
it starts to drop again. The calculations do not reproduce the first decrease in the downcomer
level, and until 1250 s the calculated level is higher than the experimental level. However, at
this moment TRACE predicts a decrease in the level up to a value slightly lower than the one
observed in the experiment.
The core and upper plenum liquid levels fall during the first 500 s. The upper plenum is
emptied at 1500 s, while the core liquid level starts to drop at about 1550 s by boil-off. Core
uncover is produced about 600 s after the primary pressure becomes lower than the secondary
one, as secondary side heat sink is lost. Calculated and experimental evolutions of core and
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upper plenum levels are quite similar, however core level is slightly higher in the calculation. At
1550 s downcomer liquid level reaches about 1/3 of its total height and the upper plenum remains
empty, in both, experiment and calculation.
CET and PCT excursions in the high pressure phase start at 1700 s (see Figure 5(d)). When
the maximum PCT reaches 750 K (at 1840 s), the HPI system starts to inject coolant into the
pressure vessel upper plenum and the water level is recovered. The evolution of PCT and CET
temperatures are well reproduced with TRACE, as the time of temperature raise and the values
reached are quite similar.
In the conditioning phase (from 2170 s to 3400 s), the core power is fixed to a constant value
until the end of the transient. Furthermore, the break valve is closed and the HPI system injects
coolant into the pressure vessel upper plenum. In these conditions, the primary pressure increases
up to about 0.42 NV at 2900 s, such behaviour is well predicted by TRACE. At this time, the hot
leg levels reach mid-loop and the HPIS injection ends. A steam generator secondary side depres-
surization is produced and the AFW injection starts. Following the secondary pressure drop, the
primary pressure decreases until around 0.25 NV. At this pressure, depressurization is finished,
the RVs are closed and the AFW injection ends. In Figure 5(a), it is observed that TRACE de-
pressurization is faster that in the experiment. Once the RVs close, the system pressures increase
until around 0.29 NV and this transient phase ends. During this phase, HPIS injection produces
core quenching, the downcomer recovers 1/3 of its liquid level and the upper plenum reaches half
its level. The pressure vessel levels increase predicted by TRACE fit very well the experimental
results during this transient phase.
At the beginning of low pressure phase transient, ROSA/LSTF pressure conditions are similar
to PKL ones and the results obtained in this phase can be compared with PKL results. The
low-pressure transient phase starts by opening the break valve at 3400 s. The primary pressure
becomes lower than the secondary one at about 4250 s and 150 s after, core boil-off is produced.
When the CET reaches 623 K, the AM action is activated. The steam generator secondary
side depressurization is initiated by fully opening of the relief valves and the AFW injection
starts. At around 4400 s, the primary pressure starts to decrease following the secondary one
(see Figure 5(a)). As occurred in the conditioning phase, TRACE depressurization is faster than
in the experiment. When primary pressure decreases, ACC injection set points are met, and
injection is produced. After that, primary pressure continues to fall reaching the LPI pressure
set point. This phase is finished when continuous core cooling is confirmed with the LPI system
actuation.
In this phase, the core liquid level, see Figure 5(c), starts to fall from 3900 s reaching the
core boil-off at 4400 s. Then, the core starts to recover due to depressurization and temporarily
decreases again due to the steam condensation produced by the ACC coolant injection into the
cold legs. From this moment on, the core is refilled until the end of the transient.
At 3484 s break opens and counterpart test transient begins. At this time, experimental and
TRACE calculations of the total mass inventory inside the vessel is the same. However, the
distribution of coolant inventory presents a discrepancy. Thus, while in the upper plenum and
dowcomer vessel the values of coolant mass predicted by the code are similar to the experiment,
in the vessel core the code predicts an excess of coolant, and in the upper head the mass is under-
estimated. Thus, due to the different distribution of coolant between the core and the upper head,
TRACE calculation overestimates core level values, what means that more coolant mass remains
in the core, influencing the evolution of CET and PCT. Moreover, TRACE5 choke models only
allow adjusting the liquid single phase and mixture coefficients, but there is no coefficient for
single phase vapour. During the first seconds after the break opening the mass flow through the
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Table 6: PKL transient. Chronological sequence of events.
Event Experiment TRACE5
time (s) time (s)
Break valve open 0 0
Start of increase in fuel rod surface temperature 937 923
Primary pressure became lower than SG secondary side pressure 1000 1000
Core exit temperature setpoint = 623 K 1345 1388
Initiation of SG secondary-side depressurization as AM action 1320 1286
Initiation of AFW in all loops 1470 1480
Maximum fuel rod surface temperature 1425 1444
Initiation of ACC system in all loops 1500 1418
Termination of ACC system in all loops 1875 1727
Initiation of LPI system in all loops 2060 1936
End of transient 4300 4300
break is a two phase mixture, but it becomes single phase vapour in a few seconds. Other authors,
as for example in (Freixa J. et al , 2015), have obtained better results in the pressure vessel levels
prediction using an in-house version of TRACE5 capable of considering a specific coefficient for
single phase vapor.
When core boil-off starts, CET and PCT excursions are produced and then they decrease due
to the coolant injection from ACC. The rise in CET and PCT is delayed in TRACE calculation,
in agreement with core level evolution, and the maximum PCT value reached is lower than
the experimental one. As depressurization, performed as an accident management measure to
maintain PCT under safe values. is triggered by the CET value, it is important to analyse the
relationship between these two parameters, shown in Fig. 6. In this Figure, it is observed that
for low CET values the calculation predicts a higher value for PCT that the one observed in the
experiment, but as CET rises the predicted PCT value is lower than the experimental one. So,
the calculation does not provide conservative values of PCT for high values of CET.
5.2. PKL results
The transient undertaken in PKL facility corresponds to the third phase of the ROSA/LSTF
transient, as PKL facility can not work at the pressures reached in the first and second phases
of the ROSA/LSTF transient. Table 6 presents the timing of the different events measured in
the experiment compared with the values predicted by TRACE. In general, a good agreement
between the experiment and the calculation is observed. In fact, the greatest deviation is observed
at the time at which the injection from accumulators finishes, as TRACE is 148 s advanced to the
experimental data. The calculations also predict an advancement of 124 s in the injection from
the LPIS.
The evolution of the most important variables is presented in Fig. 7 and, in general, a good
agreement between the experimental data and TRACE calculations in the evolution of the main
plant variables is observed. The break is produced at the start of the transient and coolant flows
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out through the break, as shown in Fig. 7(b), where TRACE and experimental values are pre-
sented. Differences between predicted and experimental values are found from the break opening
to 200 s, where the flow predicted is higher than the experimental value, and at 2500 s where the
experimental mass flow through the break presents an increase not reproduced by TRACE. As
mass flows out through the break, the coolant inventory in the primary system is reduced. The
initiating event considered is a SBLOCA, so the reduction of coolant in the primary system is
not evidenced immediately inside the reactor pressure vessel. Thus, it is not until 500 s in the
downcomer, and around 750 s in the core when the reduction in the coolant due to both, break
flow and evaporation is detected and the water level decreases, as shown in Fig. 7(c). In the
coolant inventory reduction, a delay in the TRACE calculation to predict the decrease in the
downcomer level is observed. Thus, in the experimental data such decrease is observed between
250 s and 500 s, which is not reproduced in TRACE (see Fig. 7(c)). However, from around 600
s to 800 s of the start of the transient, the experimental level is kept constant while a decrease in
the TRACE calculations is observed, and at 1000 s both values met at 0.5 NV, and a continuous
decrease is observed. A difference in the core level is observed from the start of the transient
being the experiment at 0.6 NV while TRACE predicts a value of 0.65 NV. However, the core
level decrease is advanced and faster in the calculations than in the experiment, so the minimum
level reached in the core in the simulation is below the experimental value.
The pressures in the primary and secondary systems are kept relatively constant at 0.3 NV,
from the start of the transient until 1000 s for both, experimental and TRACE calculations, as
shown in Fig. 7(a). At this time, a decrease in the primary pressure is observed due to the mass
break discharge. The calculation predicts a faster decrease in the primary pressure compared
with the experimental values. Due to this effect, the primary pressure falls below the secondary
pressure and the heat sink is lost.
Regarding the level in the core vessel, TRACE calculations predict a higher level during the
first 750 s of the transient. Around 750 s the core level starts to decrease, due to the loss of coolant
through the break and the vapour formation in the core, see Fig. 7(d), leading to core uncover.
The level decreases slightly faster than in the experiment and reaches a minimum value at 1500 s.
At 1400 s approximately, an increase in the core level is observed in the experiment, the coolant
entering the core comes from the downcomer, as can be observed in Fig. 7(c). This effect is not
reproduced by TRACE calculations, as the downcomer level predicted at 1400 s is lower than in
the experiment so, the amount of water entering the core is not enough to reproduce the core level
increase. Thus, the discrepancy in the levels inside the vessel observed in Fig. 7(c) and Fig. 7(d)
is caused by the different coolant inventory distribution observed from the start of the transient.
At 1500 s. the accumulators injection is produced, and the core level presents a sharp increase
and the consequent drop in the PCT values (see Fig. 7(d) and Fig. 7(e)). This phenomenon is
advanced in the calculations because the signal that starts safety injection is the primary pressure
and, as shown in Fig. 7(a), the calculated pressure is lower than in the experiment, so the set
point is reached earlier. In fact the injection from accumulators began at 1418 s in the calculation
while in the experiment is al 1500 s (see Table 6).
The decrease in the core level causes the increase in the cladding and coolant temperatures
as observed in Fig. 7(e), in which PCT and CET temperatures are represented. PCT and CET
evolutions are well reproduced by TRACE, although the CET is slightly higher in TRACE calcu-
lation than in the experimental data and the start of the rise is advanced 50 s. When CET reaches
the set point, secondary side depressurization is initiated (see Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(e)), as an AM
measure to decrease the primary system pressure until the accumulators pressure set point is met.
In TRACE calculations, the depressurization is advanced 34 s from the experiment, see Table 6,
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as the signal that triggers this action is the CET value which is advanced from the experimental
measurements. The accumulator injection begins when the primary pressure is lower than 0.15
NV at 1418 s in the TRACE calculations and advanced 82 s from the experimental measures as
exposed in Table 6. After the injection from the accumulators, the only heat sink available is
the steam discharge through the break, until primary pressure reaches LPIS activation set point,
and injects water in all four cold legs. This occurs at 1936 s for TRACE calculations which is
advanced again from the experiment in 124 s. As in the ROSA/LSTF installation in PKL the
depressurization is an accident management measure to maintain PCT under safe values, and is
triggered by the CET, so it is important to analyse the relationship between these two parameters
in PKL facility. Fig. 8 shows the CET vs PCT diagram and it is observed that in the calcula-
tions the PCT predicted by a certain CET value is always lower that the PCT experimental value
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Figure 5: Experimental and simulated ROSA/LSTF results: a) Primary and secondary pressure, b) Break mass flow rate,
c) Pressure vessel liquid levels and d) PCT and CET.
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Figure 4. ROSA/LSTF TRACE5 results: a) Primary and secondary pressure, b) Break 
mass flow rate, c) downcomer liquid level, d) core liquid level and e) PCT and CET. 





























































Break Mass Flow Rate
TRACE5











































































































TRACE5 Fuel Rod Temperature
TRACE5 Core Exit Temperature
Downcomer 







Figure 7: Experimental and simulated PKL results: a) Primary and secondary pressure, b) Break mass flow rate, c)
Downcomer liquid level, d) Core liquid level, and e) PCT and CET.
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Figure 8: CET vs PCT relationship at PKL.
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6. ROSA/LSTF and PKL comparison
The counterpart transient was develop to assess the efficiency of the accident management
measures in both facilities. That is, to study if PKL and ROSA/LSTF, which are facilities of
different design and scaling, will present a similar evolution when the same accident management
procedure is followed (Toth et al. , 2010). However, in the experimental data of both facilities
some differences are found, for example in ROSA/LSTF the increase in the PCT is faster and
occurs earlier than in the PKL experiment (see Fig. 5(d) and 7(e)).
The differences found in the evolution of the main variables for both installations can be re-
lated with the different scaling and/or with the difference in the technology (Querol et al. , 2014),
(Martinez-Quiroga et al. , 2014), (Toth et al. , 2010). Focusing on this latter aspect, the reactor
pressure vessel design can greatly influence the evolution of the transient, and some differences
are encountered between ROSA/LSTF and PKL facilities. In particular, in the ROSA/LSTF pres-
sure vessel there is a physical separation between the upper plenum and the upper head. However
in PKL facility both parts are connected so coolant can flow from the upper plenum to the upper
head and vice-versa. There is also a difference in the power distribution inside the core. Thus,
while in PKL the power is uniformly distributed in all directions in ROSA/LSTF installation
there is a radial and an axial power profiles, as explained in section 4.1. So, in order to verify
the influence of the vessel design in the evolution of the main variables, three new models of
PKL installation were developed in which the ROSA/LSTF vessel features are considered. The
modifications studied are the following:
• PKL-A: PKL model considering there is no coolant path between the upper plenum and
upper head of PKL reactor pressure vessel.
• PKL-B: PKL-A considering ROSAL/LSTF radial distribution.
• PKL-C: PKL-B considering ROSAL/LSTF radial and axial power distribution.
Fig. 9 shows the evolution of PCT obtained after the model changes and with PKL and
ROSA/LSTF original models. In this Figure, it is observed that the closure of coolant path from
upper plenum to upper head, PKL-A model, has a great influence in PCT evolution. Thus, calcu-
lations performed using PKL-A predict an advancement in the PCT excursion compared with the
original PKL model. This advancement is the same as observed when comparing ROSA/LSTF
with PKL original model calculations. The maximum PCT reached in the PKL original model
is drastically reduced if the coolant path in the upper parts of the vessel is not permitted, as
modelled in PKL-A. The new PCT value reached is similar to the one predicted by ROSA/LSTF
calculations. The decrease and advancement in the maximum PCT can be explained by the ad-
vancement in the CET rising and by the core level evolution, presented in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11,
respectively. On one hand, the evolution of CET temperature is similar to the PCT, that is, there
is an advancement in the rising, so the set point for the activation of the accident management
measures is reached earlier than in the PKL original model, as can be observed in Fig. 10, and
the effectiveness of depressurization and safety injection from accumulators reduce the PCT rise.
On the other hand, the evolution of the core level predicted in PKL-A model also influences the
PCT values. In Fig. 11 it is observed that PKL-A corel level starts to decrease elarlier than the
original model, but the decrease is smoother, so from 750s the level inside the core is higher for
PKL-A run than for the original PKL. As the core inventory is higher, the temperature in the clad
is maintained at lower values. Moreover, at 1200 s an increase in the core level in PKL-A model
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is observed, what stops PCT rising. In fact, a low decrease is observed when this phenomenon
occurs (see Fig. 9). This behaviour is not reproduced in PKL original model, in which the level
falls until 1400 s, when the core is almost empty (see Fig. 7(d) and Fig. 7(e)). In order to asses
if the root cause of the advancement is due to the coolant path blockage or the different power
distribution, a model using the original PKL vessel and changing the radial and axial power dis-
tribution, as in ROSA/LSTF, has been run, but no advancement was observed. Regarding the
maximum PCT value reached in PKL-A model, two phenomena explain such reduction. This
suggests that in the original PKL model needs a deeper study on the coolant path circulation
from the core to the upper plenum and upper head. Regarding the CET values, exposed in Fig.
10, the same time advancement as PCT evolution is observed, but the maximum CET value is
not reduced compared with the original PKL calculation. As the CET thermocouple is above the
core, the increase in the level is not enough to reduce the rising in the mixture temperature, and
the drop in the CET value is produced by the injection of the accumulators.
To assess the effect of the power distribution on the plant evolution variables, two models
were developed starting from PKL-A. First the radial power distribution effect has been checked.
PKL-A core model has been has been divided in three zones with different power generation,
this change is implemented in PKL-B model. The radial distribution of the heat generated in
the core has no influence on the rising time of PCT and CET, as can be seen in Fig. 9 and
Fig. 10, respectively. But, the maximum value reached by both, PCT and CET, is reduced and
delayed compared with PKL-A where all the power is generated in one zone. This effect is
explained by the thermocouples position. Thus, the PCT measurement is now in a zone with less
power production, so the value reached is lower. Regarding the CET, the thermocouple is located
outside the core, so the temperature of the coolant is given by the mixture of temperatures of the
flows coming from the three different heated zones of the core. Regarding the core level, the
behaviour is similar to the PKL-A model. So, the radial power distribution has no significant
effect on the core level behaviour (see Fig. 11).
Finally, PKL-C includes the blockage in the coolant path, the ROSA/LSTF model for radial
and axial power distribution. In particular, the axial power distribution is divided in seven axial
levels with different peaking factors. In this case, the PCT rising time is the same as in PKL-
A and PKL-B, and coincides with ROSA/LSTF predictions, but the maximum value reached is
higher. Thus, in this model the different axial power profile increase the power generated in some
axial levels, compared with the flat axial power profile used in PKL-B, so in some parts of fuel
element the power generated is higher than considering the flat power profile and, consequently
the PCT reaches a higher value. The effect on the CET produced by the consideration of the
axial profile is negligible, as can be observed in Fig. 10, when comparing PKL-B and PKL-
C results. Although PCT maximum value is higher in PKL-C than in PKL-B the core vessel
level is also higher. This effect is explained by the collapsed level definition as the liquid in the
mixture changes with the power generation, and by the axial power distribution, as in the upper





































































































































































































































Figure 10: CET evolution for ROSA, PKL, PKL-A and PKL-B models
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Figure 11: Core level evolution for ROSA, PKL, PKL-A and PKL-B models
7. Conclusions
The experiments undertaken in different facilities and inter-comparisons of the simulated re-
sults, usually performed in the frame of international programs, are used to improve the knowl-
edge on codes performance and nuclear safety. In this paper a SBLOCA transient performed
at ROSA/LSTF and PKL facilities has been simulated using TRACE code to analyse the CET
measurements effectiveness to trigger the AM measures. A good agreement between the calcu-
lations predicted by TRACE for the behaviour of the main safety variables and their respective
experimental data is observed for both, ROSA/LSTF and PKL. However, the mass coolant dis-
tribution inside the vessel predicted by TRACE in both models differs from the experimental
data, and a more detailed study is needed on the vessels geometry features and loss coefficients
to better reproduce the real coolant paths. Regarding the relationship between CET and PCT, it
was observed that the calculations do not provide conservative values of PCT for all CET values
what can affect plant safety.
The different timing in the events that take place in the transient can be caused by the scaling
and differences in the technology. In this paper the design differences between both technologies
studied are: The flow path between the upper plenum and the upper head, and the power radial
and axial distribution showing that, when PKL model is modified with this features presented
in ROSA/LSTF, TRACE predictions of the main variables of PKL installation are closer to the
evolutions observed in ROSA/LSTF, what evidences the importance of the plant design in the
evolution of the transient.
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the Universitat Politècnica de València, by the Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear under project CSN-
SIN/4078/2013/640 and by the Generalitat Valenciana under Project PROMETEOII/2014/008.
References
Applied Programming Technology, Inc. 2012. Symbolic Nuclear Analysis Package (SNAP).User’s Manual. Version
2.2.1.
AREVA, 2012. Test PKL III G7.1: SB-LOCA with Total Failure of HPSI (Counterpart Testing with ROSA/LSTF) -
Quick Look Report - AREVA NP GmbH - NTCTP-G/2011/en/0008
Belaid, S.; Freixa J.; ZerkakVihavainen O., 2010. Analysis of the Test OECD-PKL2 G7.1 with the Thermal-Hydraulic
System Code TRACE. NUREG/IA-0432. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington.
Carlos, S.; Villanueva, J.F.; Martorell, S., Serradell, V. 2008. Analysis of a loss of residual heat removal system during
mid-loop conditions at PKL facility using RELAP5/Mod3.3. Nuclear Engineering and Design 238(10), 2561-2567.
Carlos, S., Villanueva, JF., Martorell, S., Serradell V. 2011. Simulation of the F2.1 Experiment at PKL Facility Using
RELAP5/MOD3. NUREG/IA-0250. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington.
Freixa J.; Manera A. 2010. Analysis of an RPV upper head SBLOCA at the ROSA facility using TRACE. Nuclear
Engineering and Design 240 (2010) 17791788.
Freixa J.; Martnez-Quirogaa V.; Zerkakb O. and Revents F. 2015. Modelling guidelines for core exit temperature simu-
lations with system codes. Nuclear Engineering and Design 286 (2015) 116-129.
Gallardo, S., Abella, V., Verdu, G. and Querol A. 2012. Assessment of TRACE 5.0 against ROSA Test 3-1, cold leg
SBLOCA. NUREG/IA-0412. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington.
Japan Atomic Energy Agency, 2003. ROSA-V Large Scale Test Facility (LSTF) system description for the 3rd and 4th
simulated fuel assemblies
Japan Atomic Energy Agency, 2012. Final Data Report of ROSA Data Report of ROSA-2/LSTF (Counterpart Test PKL
SB-HL-18 JAEA.
Jonnet, J.R., Stempniewicz M.M., de With, A., Wakker P.H. 2013. RELAP5 analysis of PKL, main steam line break test.
Nuclear Engineering and Design 265, 755-764.
Martinez-Quiroga, V., Reventos F. and Freixa, J. 2014. Applying UPC Scaling-Up Methodology to the LSTF-PKL
Counterpart Test. Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/292916.
Nakamura, H., Watanabe, T., Takeda, T., Maruyama, Y., Suzuki M., 2009. Overview of recent efforts through
ROSA/LSTF experiments. Nuclear Engineering and Technology 41(6), 753-764.
Toth I., Prior R., Sandervag O., Umminger K., Nakamura, H., Muellner N., Cherubini M., Del Nevo A., D’Auria F.,
Dreier J., Alonso J.R., Amri A.,2010. Core Exit temperature (CET) in Accident Management of NUclear Power
Reactors. https://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/docs/2010/csni-r2010-9.pdf
Querol, A., Gallardo, S. and Verd, G. 2014. Simulation of a SBLOCA in a hot leg. Scaling considerations and application
to a nuclear power plant. Nuclear Engineering and Design http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.nucengdes.2014.10.006
Reventos, F., Freixa, J., Batet, L., Pretel, C., Luebbesmeyer, D., Spaziani, D., Macek, J., Kasahara, F., Umminger, K.
2008. An analytical comparative exercise on the OECD-SETH PKL 2.2 experiment. Nuclear Engineering and Design
238 11461154.
Umminger, K., Mandl, R. and Wegner, R. 2002. Restart of Natural circulation in a PWR-PKL test results and s-RELAP5
calculations. Nuclear Engineering and Design 125, 39-50.
Umminger, K., Dennhardt, L., Schollenberger, S. and Schoen, B. 2011. Integral Test Facility PKL: Experimental PWR
accident Investigation. Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations Vol 2012, 1-15.
USNRC. 2010a. TRACE V5.0 THEORY MANUAL Field Equations, Solution Methods, and Physical Models. U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
USNRC. 2010b. TRACE V5.0 USER’S MANUAL Volume 2: Modeling Guidelines. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
28
